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RESPONSE

THE PROBLEMS WITH PRIVACY'S
PROBLEM
Louis Michael Seidman*

There is so much right about Professor Stuntz's important and
provocative article1 that it seems a shame to ·focus exclusively on
what is wrong. So let me say at the outset that Professor Stuntz is
right to be concerned about police violence. He is right when he
asserts that privacy has a problem, and he is right that the problem
is associated with the rejection of Lochner v. New York2
In my judgment, however, Stuntz is mostly wrong about what
privacy's problem is. The real problem is not about informational
privacy, and it is both more complex and less remediable than the
one he identifies.
In Part I of this response, I suggest some reasons why the problem on which Professor Stuntz focuses is less serious than he supposes. Part II sketches the real problem and some of its
consequences.
I.

PROFESSOR STUNTZ'S PROBLEM

Stuntz deserves credit for focusing on what too many have ignored: that constitutional criminal procedure has changed as the
world view exemplified by Lochner has lost credibility.
For present purposes, Lochner stands for the proposition that
natural, discoverable, and judicially enforceable boundaries separate public and private, feasance and nonfeasance, and freedom and
coercion. According to this proposition, when the government affirmatively acts to invade a private sphere, it coerces individuals,
and its conduct is constitutionally suspect. When the government

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1968, University of Chicago; J.D. 1971, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to David Cole, Julie O'Sullivan, Mark
Tushnet, and Silas Wasserstrom for helpful comments, provided on very short notice, on an
earlier draft of this article. I owe special thanks to Wtlliam Stuntz, who, in the best tradition
of scholarly exchange, has tried to make my criticism of his work as good as it can be.
1. William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L.
REv. 1016 (1995).
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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fails to act, individuals who do not venture into the public sphere
are free, and no constitutional issue is raised by its inaction.3
The growth of the regulatory state and its constitutional validation unsettled this world view. Since 1937, the Supreme Court has
largely disclaimed the task of policing a natural boundary between
public and private,4 at least with respect to ordinary social and economic legislation.5 Instead, it has allowed the political branches
both to treat the private sphere as constituted by a pattern of government actions and inactions and to conclude that individual freedom might best be promoted by government action rather than
inaction.6 As a result, the judiciary has. been less vigorous in defending the social and economic status quo, and has demonstrated
far greater tolerance of government actions designed to redistribute
wealth and power.
For reasons I will discuss in Part II, I believe that the assimilation of this post-Lochner learning has been less complete than is
commonly supposed.7 For now, though, it is enough to observe that
the changes that have occurred could not possibly leave criminal
procedure untouched.
During the Lochner era, an individual's property was located
within the private sphere, where it was subject to judicial protection. Lochner-type thinking therefore provided a firm base for an
3. For excellent discussions of the jurisprudence of Lochner, see MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE Crus1s OF LEGAL ORTIIODOXY
9-31 (1992); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L REv. 1151, 1193-219
(1985); and Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CowM. L REv. 873 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963) ("It is now settled that States
'have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal
commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition •..•'" (quoting Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949))); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955) ("[T]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.").
5. The Court has sporadically applied a different standard to legislation affecting family
rights and procreative freedom. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973); cf. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990) (recognizing that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment). But cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195
(1986) (advocating "great resistance" to expanding the scope of the Due Process Clause because "[o]therwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the
country without express constitutional authority ").
6. Although Lochner has been largely abandoned as a limitation on legislative power,
Lochner-like ideas survive as "natural" and prepolitical limits on judicial authority. See
Louis Michael Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 379, 397-99
(1993).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 66-73.
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interpretation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments that protected
substantive rights of property. The "mere evidence" rule, which absolutely prohibited seizures of things that were neither contraband
nor the fruits or instrumentalities of crime,8 and the trespass requirement for searches, which assimilated the Fourth Amendment
to common law · property definitions,9 fit neatly within this
framework.
The conventional view of the post-Lochner world is that the
Court adjusted criminal procedure by substituting privacy for property as the constitutionally protected value.10 Thus, the Court jettisoned the mere evidence rule and thereby abandoned absolute,
property-based protections against seizures11 and replaced the
property-oriented trespass test with a free-floating, "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard for searches.12
A great strength of Stuntz's article is its convincing demonstration that this conventional view is wrong. He is plainly correct
when he asserts that informational privacy, like absolute protection
for property, is inconsistent with the presuppositions of the regulatory state.13 Today, countless government agencies regularly demand information from citizens that would have been out of
bounds under the old regime.14 Stuntz is also right when he notes
8. The rule had its origins in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P.
1765), in which Lord Crunden rejected the argument that a warrant was valid because it
served as "a means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence." 19 Howell's State Trials
at 1073; see also TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CoNSTITUilONAL lNTERPRETATION 5259 (1969). The clearest American articulation of the rule is in Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921).
9. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
10. See, e.g., Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REv. 945, 967-71 (1977). This view
finds some support in Justice Stewart's notoriously cryptic but nonetheless generative effort
to reorient Fourth Amendment law in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967):
['The] Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.
389 U.S. at 351-52 (citation omitted).
11. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
12. The test originated in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). The Court endorsed the test in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
739-41 (1979).
13. See, Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1029-34, 1052-54.
14. The Court has been quite hostile to claims that the mere provision of information to
the government violates constitutionally protected rights of privacy. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977). It has been more sympathetic when provision of the information might
chill the exercise of an independent constitutional right. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958) (free speech rights).
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the connection between these procedural changes and the expanding scope of the government's substantive powers.is
Where Stuntz has gone astray, I think, is in failing to recognize
other ways in which the law of criminal procedure has adjusted to
the change in legal regimes. The adjustment is most obvious with
respect to Fifth Amendment law. As Stuntz himself acknowledges,16 the central focus of modem self-incrimination cases is not
informational privacy. Although privacy of a sort may be a necessary condition for Fifth Amendment protection, it is no longer a
sufficient condition. Moreover, even when privacy is required, it is
not the kind of informational privacy Stuntz envisions.
Thus, the Court has repeatedly held that the Fifth Amendment
shields defendants "from producing ... [incriminating] evidence but
not from its production." 17 When the government searches a
house, wiretaps a conversation, seizes or subpoenas private papers,
or takes blood samples, it clearly invades informational privacy.
Yet these activities raise no Fifth Amendment issue.is
The modem Fifth Amendment is about individual will and freedom of thought, not informational privacy.19 Its main focus is not
on keeping things secret but on assuring that the defendant is not
forced to cooperate in the discovery of evidence that inculpates
him.
Under modem Fifth Amendment doctrine, the government may
secure incriminating information against a defendant's will, but it
may not use her will to serve its ends. For example, the government
may forcibly subject a drunk-driving suspect to a blood test because
15. See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1030-31, 1050-52.
16. See id. at 1024.
17. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 {1913} {Holmes, J.). For applications of
this holding, see, for example, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 {1976}; Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398-99 {1976); and Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328
(1973).
18. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 {1976) (holding no Fifth Amendment violation occurred during a search of an office and a seizure of private papers); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (holding that a subpoena of private papers is constitutional};
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407-08 (stating that the wiretapping of conversations raises no Fifth
Amendment issue); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that no Fifth
Amendment violation occurred when a blood sample was admitted into evidence).
19. The Court succinctly summarized its position in Fisher:
We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from the moorings of its language, and make it serve as a general protector of privacy - a word not mentioned in its
text and a concept directly addressed in the Fourth Amendment. We adhere to the view
that the Fifth Amendment protects against "compelled self incrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information."
425 U.S. at 401 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7
(1975)).
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this is something that can be done against the defendant's will.20
The government may not force the same defendant to state the date
of her sixth birthday because such a statement can be achieved only
through the exercise of will.21
True, this prohibition on the commandeering of an individual's
will is not absolute. The government is permitted to use a person's
will in circumstances in which the evidence thereby obtained does
not provide incriminating information about an individual's internal
thoughts, desires, and beliefs.22 Consider compelled handwriting
exemplars, for example. Blood can be taken against a suspect's
will, but providing a handwriting exemplar requires an exercise of
\vill. Still, compelled handwriting exemplars do not violate the Fifth
Amendment because they are thought to reveal nothing about the
defendant's internal mental state.23 Similarly, immunized testimony can be compelled even when it does provide internal information because this information is, by hypothesis, not
incriminating.24
There is therefore a sense in which Fifth Amendment law relates to the sort of information that the government obtains by
compulsion. It does not follow, however, that the Fifth Amendment is concerned with informational privacy in the sense that
Stuntz uses the term. Fifth Amendment protection does not attach
simply because a person is compelled to provide information the
government otherwise would not have learned. The government
can compel a defendant to provide it with such information - for
example, the shape of his handwriting or the sound of his voice so long as the information is not "internal" in the sense described
above. Moreover, the government can secure even "internal" in20. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764 (noting that the privilege prohibits compulsion of "communication" or "testimony" but not compulsion that makes suspect the source of "real or
physical evidence").
.
21. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (holding that compelling a suspect to
~ answer a question concerning the date of his sixth birthday violates the privilege because the
inference concerning mental confusion was drawn from this testimonial act rather than from
physical evidence).
22. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988) (holding that evidence is
testimonial for Fifth Aniendment purposes if it is expressive of the content of an individual's
mind); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957) (same).
23. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967); see also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (holding that a compelled voice exemplar does not violate the Fifth
Amendment); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1967) (holding that compelling a
defendant to stand in a lineup does not violate the Fifth Amendment); Holt v. United States,
218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910) (holding that compelling a defendant to wear an article of clothing does not violate the Fifth Amendment).
24. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (holding that use- and derivativeuse immunity are sufficient to make compelled statements constitutional).
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formation - for example, by seizing or subpoenaing a defendant's
diary - so long as it does not do so in a way that commandeers his
will.25
If I read him correctly, Stuntz understands all this.26 The mystery, then, is what, precisely, he thinks the problem with modem
Fifth Amendment law is. He is right to suppose that there is a
problem, and I explore its nature in Part II of this response. For
now, it is enough to note that, whatever its nature, the problem is
not informational privacy.
The story with respect to the Fourth Amendment is more complex. It is true that the modem Court talks about Fourth Amendment doctrine in terms of informational privacy.27 Viewed
superficially, this focus is in tension with the Court's abandonment
of substantive limits on government regulation and with its readiness to permit the government to learn all sorts of facts about our
private lives in order to implement a regulatory regime.
Once again, however, Stuntz fails to take adequate account of
how Fourth Amendment law has changed in order to accommodate
itself to the new constitutional ideology. When one focuses on
these changes, two problems with Stuntz's problem emerge.
First, Stuntz exaggerates the tension between the supposedly
strict Fourth Amendment regime and the supposedly loose regulatory regime. On the one hand, the Court has never quite retreated
to the position that there is no judicial review of regulatory legislation. Instead, it has insisted that such laws have a "rational basis"
and survive some form of low-level or minimal scrutiny.28 On the
25. Of course, the act of producing subpoenaed papers does require an exercise of will.
The act of production, however, does not normally trigger Fifth Amendment protection be·
cause mere production is usually not incriminating testimony. See Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976); cf. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (holding that an act of
production does trigger protection when it is testimonial). Although the subpoenaed papers
themselves may be incriminating, they are unprotected because their creation is ordinarily
not compelled. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10. Ironically, even if the creation of the papers is
compelled, they may still be unprotected for the very reason that the government requires
their creation. See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (announcing a required
records exception to the Fifth Amendment). For a discussion of this case, see infra text
accompanying notes 96-98.
26. See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1059-60.
27. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1967). Compare this view with Justice Black's dissent:
While I realize that an argument based on the meaning of words lacks the scope, and no
doubt the appeal, of broad policy discussions and philosophical discourses on such nebulous subjects as privacy, for me the language of the Amendment is the crucial place to
look in construing a written document such as our Constitution.
389 U.S. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting).
28. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 (1981) (defining
the issue as whether the legislation is "rationally related to achievement of the statutory
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other hand, the modem Court has not read the Fourth Amendment
as providing absolute protection against searches.29 In general,
searches are permitted so long as they are supported by some quantum of evidence - either probable cause3o or reasonable suspicion31 depending upon the context.
In recent years, the gap between these two standards has narrowed. On occasion, the Court's minimal scrutiny of social and
economic legislation has had "bite" that has led to invalidation.32
More significantly, the Court has largely retreated from the task of
reviewing probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations.
Instead of turning these standards into fixed and rigid requirements, it has treated them as a "practical, nontechnical conception"33 that is "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules."34 The Court has insisted that the expertise of the officer at the scene be considered35 and that he not be shackled by

purposes"); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (holding that legislation
should be upheld if the legislative measure is a "rational way to correct" the evil at hand for
correction); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (assuming that "a
statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof in judicial proceedings of all
facts which would show or tend to show that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty or
property had a rational basis").
29. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1967) (overruling the ''mere evidence"
rule, which had absolutely prohibited searches for certain items).
30. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983} (holding that a search for evidence was
justified on probable cause grounds); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (same).
31. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.0., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that searches of students
by teachers are permitted on reasonable suspicion).
32. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating a
zoning ordinance prohibiting a group home for the mentally retarded under rational basis
review); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating restrictions on food stamp eligibility under rational basis review). For the classic discussion, see
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
33. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
34. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975) (noting that in deciding
whether there is probable cause officers "are entitled to draw reasonable inferences ••. in
light of their knowledge of the area and their prior experience"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968) (noting that in determining whether an officer acted reasonably "due weight must be
given ••. to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience").
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post hoc judicial second guessing.36 All of this comes close to articulating what amounts to rational basis review.37
Perhaps some daylight nevertheless remains between the reformulated rational basis test and the reformulated probable cause
and reasonable suspicion standards. It is here, however, that the
second problem with Stuntz's problem takes hold. The simple fact
is that modem Fourth Amendment law has mostly assimilated the
collapse of protection for informational privacy per se. Stuntz
points out that in the regulatory context, the government is allowed
to insist upon any information it finds useful in pursuit of its goals,3B
He fails to recognize that the modem Fourth Amendment usually
provides no greater protection.
Modem Fourth Amendment law assumes that the government
is entitled to seize any item that is useful in any way to a criminal
investigation.39 True, 'the police must have probable cause to believe that they are seizing such an item.40 But so long as they seize
what they claim to want, there are essentially no judicially imposed
restrictions on what they can want.41
Modem Fourth Amendment law focuses on what might be
called the "collateral damage" imposed by searches and seizures
rather than on informational privacy. So long as a government
36. For example, the Court has held that warrant applications drafted by police officers
must reflect "nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
235-36 (1983); see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (describing probable cause as based on "factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act").
37. Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975) (holding that probable cause "does not
require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding
whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt").
38. Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1055.
39. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482-84 (1976) (holding that a seizure is
justified if the item seized is relevant to the crime under investigation); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) (holding that a seizure is justified if a nexus exists "between the item
to be seized and criminal behavior" or if "the evidence sought will aid in •.. apprehension or
conviction").
40. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-44 (1983) (plurality opinion) (holding that
probable cause is required for seizure).
41. This statement requires a minor qualification. In addition to its more specific commands, the Fourth Amendment contains a general reasonableness requirement. Hence,
wholesale or extremely burdensome seizures might violate the Fourth Amendment in circumstances in which the damage to the individual clearly outweighs the value of the seizure
to law enforcement. But precisely the same restriction applies in the regulatory context.
Compare Oklahoma Press Publishing v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946) (holding that in a
regulatory setting the ·"gist of the protection is ••• that the disclosure sought shall not be
unreasonable") with Wmston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763-67 (1985) (finding a search unreasonable despite the presence of probable cause).
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seizure imposes no such damage, it is constitutional regardless of its
costs to informational privacy.42 Only in cases in which collateral
damage is imposed must police demonstrate to a magistrate that the
damage is cost-justified.
Before summarizing the case law that supports these propositions, it may be useful to say something about what this collateral
damage typically involves. One thing it might involve is an invasion
of informational privacy. If the police search my house for drugs,
generally it will not be possible to do so by means of a surgical
strike. In the course of looking for the drugs, they are likely to see
many other things - personal possessions, private papers, and so
on - that will tell them something about me.
Stuntz correctly points out that many searches regulated by
modem Fourth Amendment law seem to impose little risk to informational privacy of this sort. Police frisks on the street, examinations of the bottom of stereos, or searches of cars, paper bags, and
cigarette packages often reveal little information about an individual.43 He is also correct when he notes that it is anomalous to be
concerned about the collateral damage to informational privacy
when there is so little concern about direct assaults upon this
value.44
What Stuntz fails to realize is that these supposed anomalies exist precisely because the primary focus of the collateral damage requirement is not informational privacy. What, then, is· the focus?
Oddly, the focus is precisely where Stuntz says it should be: on
violence, disruption, and humiliation. Consider, first, the search of
a house. I share Stuntz's concern that the Fourth Amendment does
too little to regulate illegitimate police violence in cases like
Anderson v. Creighton45 when there is probable cause to justify entry into a house. What he fails to recognize, however, is that even
legitimate police house searches necessarily entail considerable violence and disruption and that Fourth Amendment protections attach precisely because of this collateral damage imposed by
legitimate police activity.

42.
43.
44.
45.

But cf. supra note 41.
See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1019.
See id. at 1054-60.
483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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For example, police officers acting entirely lawfully and reasonably may use force to gain entry into a house.46 If the occupant is
not at home, or does not respond quickly enough, they may break
down his door or do other damage to the structure to gain entry.47
If he is at home, they may rouse him from his bed in the middle of
the night.48 Obviously, police raids can be a terrifying experience
for all involved, and the slightest miscalculation can result in serious
injury or death.49
I suppose there is a sense in which the police gain "information"
when they see the suspect unguarded, perhaps naked or in pajamas,
and surely not ready to receive guests. But this characterization
wildly distorts what is really at stake. The real injury is not the
revelation of information but the invasion of broader, more amorphous, but no less real, dignity interests.
Nor is that the end of the matter. As the search proceeds, the
police not only find out things. They also tear apart things. Victims
of searches are likely to find their personal papers scattered about
the house, their upholstery torn, their possessions in shambles.so
It bears emphasis that this sort of damage is not something that
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ignores, as Stuntz would
have us believe. On the contrary, it is precisely this damage - en46.
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any
part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or
a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant
18 U.S.C. § 3109 {1988). See generally 2 WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTII AMENDMENT § 4.8(b) (1987). The Supreme Court has not definitively settled whether the Constitution requires the police to give notice before using physical
force. See Wtlson v. Arkansas, 317 Ark. 548 {1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 571 (1994)
(granting certiorari to determine whether the "knock and announce" rule is constitutionally
required); cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) {plurality opinion) {finding that in the
presence of exigent'circumstances, a failure to give notice does not violate the Constitution).
47. See supra note 46.
48. See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 458 (1974) (holding that no special showing is required to justify a nighttime search).
49. For a tragic recent example, see Brian McGrory and Toni Locy, Minister Dies after
Botched Drug Raid, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 1994, at 1 ("A Boston Police SWAT team on a
daylight drug raid in Dorchester rammed through the door of the wrong apartment yesterday
and handcuffed a frail, retired Methodist minister, who collapsed from a heart attack and
died, according to officials.") .
.SO. Ironically, as the search proceeds, the more likely the defendant is innocent, the
greater this damage will be. If the police quickly find what they are looking for, the search
will end; damage is most extensive when police must go through everything before concluding that what they are looking for simply is not there. See, e.g., Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d
1177, 1181 {5th Cir. 1989) {describing a police search that involved breaking down doors and
breaking glass); DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THB Kn.uNo STREETS 352-54 (1991)
(detailing a police search that destroyed a room).
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tailed in perfectly legitimate police searches - that triggers Fourth
Amendment protection.
Stuntz may well be right that Fourth Amendment protection
should go beyond this point.51 Perhaps we should impose more
stringent limitations on police violence even when there is probable
cause and a warrant to justify the initial entry.52 He overlooks the
fact that the probable cause and warrant requirements exist in part
to prevent the prospect of the violence and disruption inherent in
searches unless a magistrate is satisfied that the violence and disruption are cost-justified. Because of the risk of this damage, and
not because of violations of informational privacy, Fourth Amendment law requires a warrant and probable cause before the process
begins.
Other types of searches do not impose this sort of collateral
damage, but thinking of them in terms of information seriously mischaracterizes their costs. Consider searches on the street, for example. We must not lose sight of the fact that these searches also
amount to a species of violence. A typical search requires the police to delay a suspect who is going about his business, force him to
assume a vulnerable and uncomfortable position, embarrass him
before others, and touch all parts of his body.53 Even if the search
is less intrusive - for example, opening a paper bag or requiring a
defendant to get out of his car - it may well be a terrifying experience. No matter how scrupulously the officer limits the scope of the
search, the suspect may have no way of knowing· these limits while
the search is progressing. Members of minority communities in
particular may have reason to fear that things will spin out of
control.
Instead of dealing with these very real situations, Stuntz asks us
to imagine a hypothetical officer who politely requests a suspect to
empty his pockets. Why, he asks, should a Fourth Amendment not
obsessed with informational privacy speak to this situation?54

51. See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1066-68.
52. Cf. Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment restricts the use of deadly force to effect an arrest even when there is probable cause).
53. Stuntz is correct when he observes, "The most important aspect of •.. street stop[s] to
an innocent suspect must be some combination of the stigmatizing nature of the encounter
and the police officer's use of force." Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1065. It is precisely because
street stops typically require this use of force that the Fourth Amendment regulates them.
54. See id. at 1066.
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Of course, if the suspect voluntarily acquiesces to the request,
the Fourth Amendment does not speak to it.ss To say that the suspect does not voluntarily acquiesce is to say that he submits because
of the fear of legalized violence. The suspect empties his pockets
only because he knows that if he does not, the officer is authorized
to use force to empty them for him. The Fourth Amendment regulates the officer's ability to threaten this force, not because of its
concern with informational privacy, but because threats of violence
are, themselves, a form of violence.
Wiretaps, visual surveillance, searches of parked cars, and the
like are not violent or invasive in this sense. Once again, however,
it distorts analysis to analogize the damage that they do to the damage to informational privacy that occurs when an individual fills out
a tax form. The key difference is that these police investigative
techniques typically_ catch people unaware. Because they reveal
things about people in circumstances in which they do not know
that they are being spied upon, these techniques violate human dignity. It is one thing to fill out a form that requests information
about even the most personal details of one's life. It is quite another to discover after the fact that someone has been observing
these personal details firsthand with a telescope aimed at one's bedroom window.
Understanding these differences throws Stuntz's representation
reenforcement argument into quite a different light. Stuntz claims
that representation reenforcement does not support current Fourth
Amendment doctrine because unrepresented minorities victimized
by police searches actually receive more protection than middleclass persons who claim tax deductions or secure business licenses.s6
But this claim is true only if one insists on limiting the costs of police activity to informational privacy. Of course, the costs are not so
limited, and no middle-class individuals filling out tax forms are
subject to the threatened and real violence, the humiliation, disruption, and embarrassment inherent in much police activity.
Moreover, the crucial fact is that when these collateral costs are
not imposed - when the cost of police activity is solely to informational privacy - modern Fourth Amendment doctrine usually does
not provide protection.
Consider first the plain view doctrine. In essence, this doctrine
provides that police officers need not have advance judicial ap55. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 {1973) (upholding consensual
search without warrant or probable cause).
56. See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 104447.
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proval when they seize an item without imposing the sort of collateral damage described above. If the police are already legitimately
where they need to be to effectuate the seizure and are already permitted to use the force they need to use, then the seizure is
permissible.57
Cases defining what constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes stand for a similar proposition. In general, police activity
does not count as a search unless it imposes the sort' of collateral
damage described above. Consider, for example, the case of dog
sniffs of closed containers. Unlike typical police activity, these
searches really are surgical strikes. The dog reveals the presence of
illegal drugs and nothing else. Precisely because the search imposes
no collateral damage, the Court has treated it as outside the scope
of the Fourth Amendment.58
It is especially instructive to compare dog sniffs with urine testiiig for drugs. Viewed from the perspective of informational privacy, the two techniques are identical. So long as the testing is
confined to illicit drugs,59 both techniques reveal only the presence
of an illegal substance without providing any additional information
to investigators. Yet the Court has treated urine testing as a search
regulated by the Fourth Amendment6o because, in our culture,
57. For example, in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993), an officer conducting
a legal frisk for weapons felt a lump no bigger than a marble. The Court held that the resulting seizure of crack cocaine would have been constitutional if this "plain touch" had given
rise to probable cause to believe that the defendant possessed seizable evidence, because the
defendant would not have suffered any invasion beyond the legitimate invasion inherent in
the frisk. 113 S. Ct. at 2137-38. Because the officer subjected the defendant to the additional
indignity of "squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of [his] pocket," the
search was unlawful. 113 S. Ct. at 2138-39 (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840,
844 (Minn. 1992)); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) {"What the
'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused."). The Court discarded the "inadvertence" requirement
in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
58. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 123 {1984) ("A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular
substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.").
To be sure, these Fourth Amendment cases rest in part on the absence of collateral damage to interests in informational privacy. The important point is that the Court is inclined not
to treat as searches police invasions that do not impose collateral damage of some sort.
59. In the course of holding that urine testing constitutes a Fourth Amendment search,
the Court did note that such testing might reveal other "private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic." Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). But it is h~d to see why the possibility
that other sorts of tests might reveal these facts should be relevant if the tests actually performed reveal no more than illicit drug use.
60. See 489 U.S. at 616-18.
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urine testing imposes collateral damage to interests in human
dignity.61
Other cases in the Court's concededly confused jurisprudence
concerning the constitutional definition of searches follow a similar
pattern. For example, the Court has held that police examination
of open fields62 and of curbside garbage63 are not searches for constitutional purposes. There can be no doubt that this sort of police
activity reveals information. What it does not do is subject the defendant to violence, disruption, or humiliation. Finally, consider
the Court's treatment of cases involving subpoenas. Subpoenas
amount to self-searches. They involve no violence, no disruption,
no public humiliation or embarrassment.64 Like the required completion of tax returns, subpoenas invade informational privacy but
impose no collateral damage. For precisely this reason, the Court
treats them no differently from tax returns. So long as the subpoena is "reasonable" and not unduly burdensome, a defendant has
no Fotµth Amendment right not to comply.6s
The upshot is that modem Fourth Amendment law is mostly
consistent with the post-Lochner validation of the regulatory state.
When police only invade informational privacy, they are no more
subject to judicial interference than modem regulators. The Fourth
Amendment has bite only when police efforts impose collateral
damage of a sort not typically imposed by regulatory intervention.
So what's the problem?
II. THE REAL PROBLEM

There is a problem, and it is serious. Indeed, it is far more serious than Stuntz imagines. The problem, however, is not about informational privacy. It is about the status of individual rights in
general - about privacy broadly conceived - in a post-Lochner
world.
61. ·The Court quoted with approval the following language from a lower court decision:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine.
Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function tradi·
tionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.
489 U.S. at 617 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175
(1987), remanded on other grounds, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)).
62. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
63. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
64. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 573 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (observing that "a subpoena would permit the newspaper itself to produce only the specific
documents requested").
65. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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To see the nature of the problem, consider the following not
very hypothetical66 hypothetical: A public housing project is completely inundated by drugs and violent crime. By a large majority,
terrified residents vote to allow the police to conduct random
searches of apartments for weapons and drugs, and police respond
by conducting such searches.
What are we to make of this situation in a post-Lochner world?
Recall that the revolt against Lochner was, among other things, a
revolt against the distinctions between feasance and nonfeasance,
and public and private. If we are to take the anti-Lochner position
seriously, it turns standard Fourth Amendment doctrine on its
head. The most serious threat to the "persons, houses, papers, and
effects" of housing project residents comes not from public sources,
the police, but from private sources, the criminals. If the residents
are to be made "secure" from these "unreasonable searches and
seizures," what is required is not government inaction but government action. 67 It follows that it is the failure of police to conduct
searches and seizures that is constitutionally problematic. The
Constitution might even be read to require searches conducted on
less than probable cause.
Of course, no court would accept such ari argument - at least
not yet.68 The fact that no court would accept it demonstrates our
continuing ambivalence about the overthrow of the Lochner ideology. This ambivalence is rooted in the inchoate but well-grounded
fear that jettisoning Lochner altogether would let go of the very
idea of individual rights and limited government.
Yet if we cannot quite let go of Lochner, neither can we embrace it. Suppose we add the following twist to the hypothetical: In
response to community pressure, housing officials add a term to
each lease requiring that occupants "consent" to searches of their
premises.69 Armed with this consent, police conduct random
searches.
66. See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
67. See Vmcent Lane, Public Housing Sweep Stakes: My Battle with the ACLU, 69 HERITAGE FoUND. PoLY. REv. Summer 1994, at 68 (providing a defense of sweeps for weapons
from the perspective of the Chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority).
68. See Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 797 (preliminarily enjoining police sweeps of public housing
apartments for weapons); cf. McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 647 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that a public housing requirement that houseguests register with management violates fundamental rights of association and privacy).
69. Cf. Gwen Ifill, Clinton Asks Help on Police Sweeps in Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 1994, at Al (reporting that the Administration urged housing officials to ask tenants
for standing consent for searches).
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The outcome of this case is far less obvious.10 Perhaps the
Court would say that the government has "coerced" consent by
withholding housing or that it has "unconstitutionally conditioned"
access to such housing.71 Yet it might also say that the government
has done no more than "offer" a gratuitous benefit - public housing - which no one need accept, and that housing residents are
made no worse off when the benefit is conditioned on giving up
what would otherwise be Fourth Amendment rights.12
This confusion, too, results from our ambivalence about
Lochner and the growth of the regulatory state. In a world with a
natural division between public and private spheres, it was possible
.to imagine individuals making choices within the private sphere
that were unconstrained by government. But post-Lochner constitutionalism permits the government to shift the baseline by subsidizing a wide range of activities - for example, housing. Of
course, the ability to subsidize entails the ability to withdraw the
subsidy. Hence, private decisions are always made against the
backdrop of a network of governmentally imposed incentives that
can be characterized as either offers or threats depending upon
whether one wants the decision to appear free or coerced.73
Significantly, the administrative search and the special need
cases that Stuntz emphasizes are all caught in this netherland between a post-Lochner regulatory state and the pre-Lochner world
70. Compare Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F2d 284, 289 {5th Cir. 1971) {holding that the state
may not "require a student to waive his protection from unreasonable searches and seizures
as a condition to his occupancy of a college dormitory room") with United States v. Doran,
482 F.2d 929, 932 {9th Cir. 1973) {finding the implication of consent "unavoidable" in a case
in which the defendant brought luggage on board an aircraft when signs and public address
warnings announced that all passengers were subject to search).
71. Cf. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 837 {1987) {holding that the
Commission's conditioning a building permit on the transfer of an easement to the public was
invalid as "an out-and-out plan of extortion" (citation omitted)).
72. Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 {1991) {holding that to condition a grant of
federal funds to family planning clinics on their agreement not to provide counseling concerning abortion is acceptable because " 'a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise
of a fundamental right does not infringe the right'" (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983))).
73. In recent years, some of our best constitutional scholars have turned their attention to
the conditional offer problem. For some of the most sophisticated efforts to find a solution,
see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING wrra THE STATE (1993); Seth F. Kreimer, A/locational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293
(1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413 (1989);
and Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DmGo L.
RBv. 337 (1989). An evaluation of these efforts is well beyond the scope of this response.
For an argument that the efforts are bound to fail and that this failure challenges the coherence of constitutional argument in general, see Loms MICHAEL SBIDMAN & MARK V.
TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF. CONSITrUTIONAL DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF CYNICISM
ch. 4 (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript on file with author).
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of private spheres and individual rights. Consider: for example,
New fork v. Burger. 74 The Court held that because the junkyard
industry is heavily regulated, the police may dispense with the usual
requirements of a warrant and probable cause before conducting an
"administrative" search.
On its face, this holding seems puzzling: Why should regulation
of some constitutionally unprotected aspects of Burger's business
justify regulation of other constitutionally protected aspects? The
Court responded to this puzzle by relying in part on a version of
consent: "When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a [government] license, he does so
with the knowledge that his business records ... will be subject to
effective inspection." 75 Because the government was not required
to allow Burger to deal in junk in the first place, he can hardly complain when it couples its permission with a requirement that he consent to searches.
Under the Lochner regime, this explanation made some sense.
Lochner presupposed a natural and judicially discoverable line between public and private. The government was allowed to control
businesses affected with the public interest precisely because they
were public.76 In contrast, the right to engage in "ordinary" business was not created by the state. It was natural and prepolitical,
and the state was therefore prohibited from conditioning its
exercise.77
In the post-Lochner world, this distinction is no longer viable.78
Because the distinction between public and private is constructed
rather than natural, the government's right to regulate extends to
virtually any business. As the Burger dissent effectively demon74. 482 U.S. 691 {1987).
75. 482 U.S. at 701 (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 {1972)).
76. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 {1877) {holding that a system of fixed maximum
charges for grain-storage warehouses did not violate due process because the private property's use implicated a public interest).
77. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932} (invalidating law
prohibiting a· pe{Son from manufacturing ice without state permission because the business ·
was not charged with public use).
78.
It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public
interest.•.• The phrase "affected with a public interest" can, in the nature of things,
mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the
public good. In several of the decisions of this court wherein the expressions "affected
with a public interest," and "clothed with a public use," have been brought forward as
the criteria •.. it has been admitted that they are not susceptible of definition and form
an unsatisfactory test
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 {1934).

1096

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:1079

strates,79 the regulation of the junk business was no greater than the
real or potential regulation of virtually any activity in New York.
Th.us, Stuntz is right when he notes8o that the logic of Burger can be
extended to automobiles81 or, indeed, to almost anything else. After all, there is no constitutional right to sidewalks; in principle,
walking on sidewalks could be treated as a highly regulated activity.
Of course, the Court has not so extended Burger. But neither
has it explained why it has not. That, in a nutshell, is privacy's
problem.
Many - although not all82 - of the special needs cases reflect
a similar dilemma. No one has a constitutional right to work at a
railroad,83 to receive welfare,84 or to be put on probation after being convicted of an offense.85 People who engage in these activities
have therefore "consented" to searches designed to regulate them.
Yet there is also, of course, a sense in which these people have not
consented at all. They have merely succumbed to pressure exerted
through the withholding of vital benefits. In the post-Lochner
world, there is no way in principle to decide the category in which
such cases should be placed.
As bad as all of this is, it is with regard to Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence that the rejection of Lochner has been most destabilizing. Th.ere is a sense in which consent is ancillary to Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Although consent "waives" Fourth Amendment protection, the protection itself consists of the right to avoid
the sort of collateral damage described above. In contrast, the Fifth
Amendment at its core is about individual choice. As argued
above,86 its central prohibition is against the harnessing of individ79. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 720-22 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1040-41.
81. Indeed, in modified form, it has been. Tue Court's shifting rationale for the exception
to the warrant clause for automobiles has occasionally focused on their heavy regulation by
the government See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
82. Tue Court's treatment of school searches seems to be sui generis and not easily explained on an implied consent theory. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (relying
on the need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place to hold that the
legality of school searches requires reasonableness, not probable cause).
83. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (allowing drug
testing of railway workers); see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989) (allowing drug testing of Customs Service workers); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709 (1987) (allowing for some office searches of government workers).
84. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding law allowing warrantless home
visits by welfare caseworkers).
85. See Griffin v. WtSconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (upholding regulation that allowed for a
warrantless search of probationers' homes).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.

March 1995]

Problems with Privacy's Problem

1097

ual will for .government ends. If the rejection of Lochner makes
that concept incoherent, we are in deep trouble indeed.
To see the trouble it makes, consider Lefkowitz v. Turley. 87
Under New York law, individuals who contracted with the state
were required to testify at judicial proceedings concerning such
contracts. If they refused, existing contracts could be cancelled and
future contracts denied for five years. When appellees refused to so
testify because the testimony might incriminate them, they were
threatened with the cancellation of their contracts. The Supreme
Court held that this threat violated their Fifth Amendment rights.ss
There is a sense in which this decision is surely right. The threat
of loss of employment made appellees worse off if they failed to
testify than they would have been if they had testified. This difference in treatment influenced their decision in the same way that a
contempt citation for failure to testify would have. Their choice
was therefore not "free," and the pressure violated the privilege.89
Matters are complicated, however, when we compare Lefkowitz
to United States v. Rylander. 90 In Rylander, the defendant was
served with a subpoena that demanded certain books and records. 91
'OT. 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
88. 414 U.S. at 85.
89. The Court was correct in holding that nothing turned on whether the cancellation of
contracts was itself a criminal penalty. The Self-Incrimination Clause guarantees an individual's right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution. It
follows that every valid Fifth Amendment claim requires the presence of two elements: compulsion and incrimination - that is, use of compelled testimony against the defendant in a
criminal prosecution. In Lefkowitz, the contractual cancellations were relevant, not because
they were criminal in nature, but because they provided compulsion. The incrimination element was satisfied because there was a risk that the statements thereby compelled might
have been used in a future criminal prosecution against the individual making them.
It follows that if the government eliminates the risk of incrimination by granting immunity, compulsion is then eonstitutionally permissible. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441 (1972). This analysis leads to a paradox. In an earlier decision, Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967), the Court reversed the criminal ci>nviction of a police officer because the
State had introduced against him statements made after he was threatened with the loss of
his job if he did not respond. In effect, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to de
facto use immunity: because the statements were compelled, the Fifth Amendment privilege
would be violated if they were also incriminating. They therefore could not be used in the
criminal prosecution.
The upshot of Garrity is that if the Lefkowitz contractor had testified, he too would have
been entitled to de facto use immunity. Because his statements would therefore not have
been incriminating, it is unclear precisely why they could not be compelled.
In United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), the Court attempted to resolve this paradox
by holding that the government could not rely upon de facto use immunity to justify compulsion. Instead, the government could compel testimony only if it formally granted immunity.
The decision rests on the dubious theory that the rule is necessary to protect the government
from ill-considered or inadvertent grants of immunity.
90. 460 U.S. 752 (1983).
91. 460 U.S. at 754.
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Rylander responded by testifying that he did not have the documents and, on Fifth Amendment grounds, stoutly refusing to answer any questions concerning what had become of them.92 The
Supreme Court rejected application of the privilege in this context.
It held that once the papers were subpoenaed, the defendant had
the responsibility to explain nonproduction.93 Although the Fifth
Amendment was available as a shield to ward off burdens imposed
by the government, it could not be used as a sword to meet the
defendant's own burden.94
Although it may not be immediately apparent, Rylander rests on
unconstitutional condition analysis. Rylander had a right to remain
silent, but, having failed to produce the requested documents, he
had no right to remain out of prison. The government may therefore condition his right to remain out of prison on his willingness to
explain what had happened to the documents.
It should be readily apparent, however, that this holding transforms Lefkowitz into a mere drafting problem. The Lefkowitz contractor received Fifth· Amendment protection solely because the
Court assumed that he started from a baseline of being entitled to
his contractual relationship with the state. Nothing in the Constitution prevents the state from shifting this baseline. The state might
have said that contractors can do business with it only if they bear
the burden of proving that they have not engaged in bribery.
Rylander appears to mean that if the state phrases the initial entitlements in this way, the Lefkowitz protection evaporates. 95
92. 460 U.S. at 754-55.
93. 460 U.S. at 757.
94. 460 U.S. at 758.
95. Consider, for example, the problem posed by Selective Service System v. Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984). Congress conditioned the receipt of
federal financial assistance for higher education on male students' registering for the draft.
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 562(£) (1988). The statute further required students requesting aid to
file a statement attesting to their compliance with the draft registration statute. Students who
had not registered challenged the requirement, arguing that it compelled incriminating statements in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
The Court's decision focused on the alleged compulsion to register created by the scheme.
Although revelation of the student's birthday on the registration form might be incriminating, the Court held that a student could claim a Filth Amendment privilege at that point. 468
U.S. at 858.
Suppose the Court had focused instead on the compulsion to file a statement of compliance with the draft. At first blush, it might seem that the case is indistinguishable from
Lefkowitz. On closer analysis, however, it becomes apparent that the scheme does not compel students to reveal the incriminating fact of nonregistration. True, they will be denied
financial assistance if they attempt to claim their Filth Amendment privilege by refusing to
file the form. But they will also be denied financial assistance if they state on the form that
they have failed to register. Because they are treated no differently whether or not they
claim the privilege, they are not compelled to reveal incriminating information.
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Fifth Amendment cases decided in a regulatory setting rest on
precisely this analysis. The required records exception holds that a
participant in a regulated industry has no Fifth Amendment right to
withhold records that are required by a regulatory scheme.96 In announcing the exception, the Court relied upon the fact that "the
Government can constitutionally regulate or forbid the basic activity concemed."97 This greater authority effectively shifted the baseline so that the government could also "require the keeping of
particular records, subject to inspection by the Administrator,"98 as
a condition of engaging in the underlying activity.
Many people are uncomfortable with these results, partially because they seem to torture ordinary language. Individuals pressured by the denial of crucial benefits have "chosen" to incriminate
themselves in only a Pickwickian sense. At base, the reason for this
discomfort is that post-Lochner analysis makes ordinary-language
understandings of freedom and coercion incoherent. It is always
true of every choice that it is made against a backdrop of government actions and nonactions that makes one choice more desirable
than the other. What, then could it possibly mean for an individual
to act "freely"?
In the post-Lochner intellectual environment, the Fifth Amendment can be rescued from incoherence only by reformulating it so
that it is not about individual will after all. Because exercises of will
never occur in a vacuum and are always influenced by government,
what matters is not whether individuals have freely chosen but the
legitimacy of the background conditions that dictate the choice.
Once this much is conceded, however, it is hard to see the sense
in which the Fifth Amendment protects individual rights. If we are
dealing not with individual choice but with publicly created background conditions, it would seem that all decisions become social
and collective and that no room remains for decisions by autonomous individuals.
Further difficulties emerge when we try to establish limits on the
ability of government to manipulate background conditions. Even
after the demise of Lochner, we are not ready to give up entirely on
The absence of compulsion derives from the government's shifting of the baseline. In
order to receive financial assistance, students have the burden of demonstrating compliance
with the draft law. The state could have achieved a similar outcome in Lefkowitz by requiring contractors affirmatively to establish the legality of their previous contracting activities.
96. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17, 33 (1948).
97. 335 U.S. at 32.
98. 335 U.S. at 32.
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the existence of natural and prepolitical baselines. Suppose, for example, the government tried to reverse Rousseau's famous observation and proceeded on the assumption that people are born in
chains but everywhere are free. Presumably, the Court would not
sit still for the evisceration of the Fifth Amendment by making defendants bear the burden of proving that they are innocent in order
to get the "benefit" of nonincarceration.
Unfortunately, however, the rejection of Lochner makes it difficult to evaluate the justice of various background conditions. During the Lochner era, the Court attempted to generate these
conditions by imagining what individuals would choose in some
prepolitical state.99 The Lochner regime collapsed in part because
it became apparent that the people doing this imagining were already located politically and that this location significantly influenced their imaginings. The upshot was that the attempt to
generate background conditions led to a circle: The conditions
were generated by what individuals would choose, but individual
choice was a product of the conditions.
As a result, in the post-Lochner intellectual environment, our
intuitive feel for constitutionally mandated baselines is fragile and
contextually contingent. For example, it apparently remains true
that the government may not start with the assumption that everyone belongs behind bars with the burden of proving why they
should become free. But as soon as one moves from this extreme
position, there is little else that can be said with certainty. Thus, the
Court has made a complete hash out of determining precisely when
the Constitution requires that conduct be considered a part of the
offense - which the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt - and when it is an affirmative defense that the defendant
must bear the burden of proving in order to avoid incarceration.100
Similarly, one would have thought that if there were any natural
baseline that was widely accepted in our society, it would be the
right of biological parents to raise their children. Yet in a case con99. See Peller, supra note 3, at 1193-219.
100. See John Calvin Jeffries & Paul B. Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE LJ. 1325, 1346-47 (1979} (arguing that when a defense is
"gratuitous" in the sense that the state legislature could shift the baseline by denying it altogether, the defendant cannot complain when it is recognized, but the State is not required to
prove its absence beyond a reasonable doubt). Compare Mullaney v. Wtlbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975) (holding unconstitutional a murder statute that required the defendant to bear the
burden of rebutting a statutory presumption that he had committed the offense with malice
aforethought} with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense
of extreme emotional disturbance).
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cerning a child born of an adulterous relationship, the Court hel!i
that even these rights are rooted in positive law that the state is free
to change.101 The implications for the Fifth Amendment are obvious, yet startling nonetheless. In Baltimore Department of Social
Services v. Bouknight, 102 the Court made an analogy between child
rearing and a regulated industry103 and thus held that Ms.
Bouknight was not coerced when her right to custody of her child
was conditioned on her willingness to act in a fashion that could
incriminate her.

* * *

So privacy has a problem, all :right, but the probleµi is not about
information. It is about nothing less than hanging onto a conception of ourselves as autonomous individuals living private lives in
the post-Lochner intellectual enviromnent. Of course, in one way
or another, we have managed to hang onto this conception. Giving
up on it is giving up on too much of our internal experience - of
how we see ourselves and how we conceptualize the lives we lead.
Post-Lochner ideology leaves us caught between this experiential
reality, which is too real to abandon, and a legal environment,
which no longer provides it much support.
In short, privacy's problem is tlte ·central problem for modem
constitutional law. Patching up a few criminal procedure doctrines
is not likely to produce a solution.

101. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-30 (1989).
102. 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
103. 493 U.S. at 558-59.

